Will a European Security Council bring strategic relevance? 
Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 124 March 2020 by Coelmont, Joel.
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
No. [ ] 
[Date] 
No. 124 
March 2020 
Will a European Security Council bring strategic 
relevance? 
Jo Coelmont 
Europe is looking to be a global player 
rather than just a global playground. 
To achieve this, it needs a security 
council. This is essential for gaining 
strategic relevance. Europe needs to 
have recourse not only to international 
fora but also to a series of instruments 
of hard and soft power. Swift decision 
making at the appropriate level is of 
paramount importance.  
Such a security council should meet a 
number of requirements: it must be 
representative, be able to both achieve 
unity of vision and undertake action 
smoothly, and keep going until the 
desired end-state has been achieved. 
Several proposals have been made as 
to the composition of such a body. I 
will look into the four most discussed 
options. Are we spoilt for choice? 
 
WORKING THROUGH NATO 
The core of NATO is Article 5, which is of vital 
importance, and not just for the Europeans. For 
the United States the old strategic truth remains 
valid: the power that has Europe on its side has 
the potential to dominate world affairs. For non-
Article 5 scenarios, the US prefers to forge ad-
hoc coalitions to address each individual crisis. 
Whenever the European rather than the 
American interest is at stake, Washington expects 
the Europeans to forge its own such coalitions. 
NATO’s role would at most be that of a 
“supporting agency”—see Afghanistan (strategy 
determined in Washington) and Libya (without 
any strategy). These examples also demonstrate 
that a military approach alone is insufficient. 
However, NATO cannot provide the other 
instruments and means that a more 
comprehensive approach would require.  
 
THE “E3-FORMAT”   
Within this strictly intergovernmental format, it’s 
not impossible to image that consensus can be 
reached more smoothly between France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom about how to 
address a particular crisis (even if Germany is 
unlikely to smoothly align itself with the French 
and British strategic cultures). But how then to 
mobilize the required military, civilian, and 
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economic capabilities? Already at the 1998 Saint-
Malo summit between the UK and France, it was 
obvious that addressing even a relatively limited 
crisis such as the civil war in the former 
Yugoslavia required the input of all EU member 
states and all EU institutions. While EU decision-
making on foreign policy today—even with 
qualified majority voting (QMV)—is often 
difficult, if not impossible, nothing can guarantee 
that a proposal coming from just two member 
states (offering a privileged position to one non-
member state) could count on the capabilities of 
the other member states and the European 
Commission for its implementation. Even if the 
current E3 format were to be enlarged to include 
one or more member states, the impression of 
being dictated to from above would remain. This 
option lacks sufficient representation. 
 
TREATY CHANGE  
Amending the European treaties would 
guarantee perfect representation, at least within 
the EU. Such a step requires a long ratification 
process, however. Then the question arises: 
should the establishment of a European Security 
Council be the only subject of treaty change, or 
should it be framed as part of the broader 
Conference on the Future of Europe, which 
starts this year and is due to conclude by the 
summer of 2022? The best can be the enemy of 
the good. Urgency and uncertainty necessitate 
that we instead creatively look for other formulas, 
without damaging representation. 
 
AN EU SUMMIT / EU SECURITY COUNCIL  
Nothing prevents the EU from labelling an extra 
meeting of the European Council a “European 
Union Security Council (EUSC)” when heads of 
state and government are addressing matters of 
international security. This is the right level, for 
peace and security are matters that need to be 
discussed at this top level and demand a 
combined intergovernmental and community 
approach. In order to be credible, each time it is 
convened, such an EUSC must be able to reach 
consensus about the political objectives and the 
actions to be taken. That will only be possible if 
political agreement can be found about a 
dedicated decision-making process for the 
EUSC, which leaves space for the heads of state 
and government as well as the president of the 
European Commission and the EU’s High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs. 
Keeping the UK close in this context is 
important. However, having “third countries” at 
the table would not fit into the EU’s architecture 
and culture. That lesson has been learned the 
hard way. Offering “associated” or “observer” 
membership to third countries within the 
Western European Union (WEU) framework—
for very good reasons at first glance—has over 
time damaged that union beyond repair. This is 
why that body’s competences were transferred to 
the EU, as requested by France and … the UK. 
This brings us to the ultimate question. 
 
HOW WOULD AN EUSC OPERATE? 
Five elements are essential for an EUSC to be 
effective. 
First, the agenda: the EUSC would exclusively 
address matters of international security. 
Second, unity of vision: this would be achieved 
on the basis of the proposal that garners the most 
support. Member states would be able to 
“constructively abstain,” and justify that 
abstention publicly. A veto would only be 
acceptable if the proposed course of action would 
directly endanger the national security, in the 
narrowest sense, of a member state. Qualified 
majority voting would not fit the nature of the 
issues at stake; “constructive flexibility” would—
safeguarding global security without detracting 
from the specific national security interests of 
individual member states. 
Third, who undertakes which action: the required 
assets would be generated through “capability-
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generation conferences” under the supervision of 
the heads of state and government together with 
the European Commission. Member states, 
however, could not be obliged to contribute, 
except where the Treaty already today stipulates 
otherwise. The Commission, for its part, would 
always deploy its relevant instruments and means. 
Fourth, follow-up: the EUSC would commit to 
continuously take follow-up action until the 
desired end-state is reached, taking additional 
measures as and when necessary. 
Fifth, partners: when elaborating a course of 
action, EU partner countries would be consulted 
from the start about potential participation. The 
EUSC would not only look to non-member 
European countries—with the UK as primus 
inter pares —but also across the Atlantic, to the 
US, and even world-wide, including organizations 
such as the United Nations and the African 
Union, and even countries such as China and 
Russia, if and when that may be suitable. 
TIME TO ACT 
The EU is a unique political construction. A 
European Union Security Council would be the 
last piece of the puzzle permitting it to pursue a 
real security policy. Only the option of setting up 
an EUSC guarantees the conditions for success. 
As such, we are not spoilt for choice. 
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